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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
E. JERRY FIVAS and ALAIRE J. \
FIVAS,
I
Plaintiffs and Respondents, I
—vs.—

JOSEPH F. PETERSEN and
FLORENCE E. PETERSEN,

\

No. 8470

\
j

Defendants and Appellants, f

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF
PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
The plaintiffs and respondents respectfully petition
this Court for a rehearing on its opinion issued in the
above entitled cause on the 16th day of August, 1956. The
petition is based upon the following grounds:
1. The majority opinion misconstrues the plain intent of Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code Annotated
1953, by making the County an entity for the performance and responsibility of particular county officials.
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2. The majority opinion misconstrues the apparent intent of Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by demanding that the County Treasurer ascertain the address of the taxpayer.
3. The majority opinion makes an assumption of
facts not supported by the record.
The attorneys for the plaintiffs and respondents
hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is made in
good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
Eespectfully submitted,
JAMES W. BELESS, J E .
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
AKGUMENT
Our analysis of this Court's opinion dated August
16, 1956 leads us to conclude that the majority of the
Court has construed Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 by applying two separate theories to find
the notice given to the taxpayer by the County Treasurer
as insufficient. First, the county is determined to be an
entity for purposes of responsibility under the taxing
statutes, and knowledge of other county officials is
charged to the Treasurer. Second, the legislature must
not have meant what it said by deletions of duties of
the Treasurer by the amendment of the statute in 1931,
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and the duty remaining of mailing a notice to the taxpayer at his address, "if known," is construed to mean
"if ascertainable."
The majority opinion clearly demonstrates the
Court's impelling conviction that forfeitures should be
prevented if any inequities are thereby caused. Complementing the effect of the above theories of statutory construction, the majority opinion finds in this situation per
se an inequity because it involves a tax title.
Our contentions that the Court has misconstrued
the statutes and has misapplied facts are set forth under
the following separate points.
POINT I
THE MAJORITY OPINION MISCONSTRUES THE
PLAIN INTENT OF SECTIONS 59-10-9 AND 10 BY MAKING THE COUNTY AN ENTITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE
AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICULAR COUNTY OFFICIALS.

The majority opinion construes Sections 59-10-9 and
10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by considering the County
as an entity for the discharge of that portion of the taxing procedure directed by statute to the County Assessor
and Treasurer. That opinion states:
"The recorder, by placing a deed on record,
the assessor, by carrying the information from
the deed to the assessment rolls, and the treasurer,
by sending out the notices and collecting the taxes,
are all performing duties upon which part of the
taxing process depends. If they collectively fail
to perform the duties to the taxpayer and the
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public required by the statutes, that failure is
chargeable to the county as the taxing entity."
We submit that the practical effect of such a construction of those sections would impose duties prescribed solely for discharge by the Treasurer upon the
Eecorder, Assessor, Auditor or other officials. The
statutes are clear in giving certain named officials certain duties. We believe those duties cannot be delegated,
without thereby violating the rule of strictissimi juris
when such delegated acts are considered in tax title litigation. We believe that knowledge in the Eecorder or
information in his office cannot be charged to the Assessor or the Treasurer by the imposition of this fiction
of "county entity." We submit that such delegation of
duties and charging of knowledge as between county
officials is a strained construction of the taxing statutes
which have been written in detail purposely to pinpoint
responsibility on certain officials and to spell out their
duties.
For an example, Chapter 8, Title 59, is entitled
"County Auditor's Duties." It would be a manifest distortion of legislative intent to declare duties therein defined as those of the Auditor to be performable by the
other county officials or the "county entity." In Telonis
v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2d 513 at 517 this Court
stated:
"The affidavit is one of the statutory functions of the county auditor and such affidavit
must be executed and properly attached."
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"We believe that this Court would have found an affidavit executed by any other county official than the
auditor as illegal and sufficient to have voided any subsequent tax sale. The logical extension of the reasoning
of this Court in the instant opinion would, in making
the county an entity for purposes of placing responsibility under the taxing statutes, condone such an irregularly executed affidavit.
The effect of the majority opinion's theory of the
"county entity" appears to be to charge the Treasurer
and the Assessor with knowledge of any address
for a taxpayer as found in the office of any other county
official; thus, an address for a taxpayer in the Recorder's office is by this fiction known to the Treasurer or
the Assessor within the meaning or "if known" in the
wording of Sections 59-10-9 and 10. We believe that
any such application of a fiction of "county entity"
strains any possible undisclosed intent of the legislature
beyond reason.
We submit that the only reasonable meaning of the
words of Section 59-10-9, "The county treasurer shall
furnish to each taxpayer by mail to the address . . . if
known, a notice . . ." is directed to the Treasurer and to
him alone. We submit that the words "if known" must
reasonably mean "if known to the Treasurer or if found
in his office."
POINT II
THE MAJORITY OPINION MISCONSTRUES THE
CLEAR INTENT OF SECTIONS 59-10-9 AND 10 BY DE-
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MANDING THAT THE COUNTY TREASURER ASCERTAIN
THE ADDRESS OF THE TAXPAYER.
The second effect of the majority opinion appears
to be to construe the words "if known" in Sections
59-10-9 and 10 to mean "if ascertainable." What degree
of diligence shall be used by the Treasurer in his search
for the taxpayer is left to his judgment and reason.
We believe that any construction of Sections 59-10-9
and 10 to retain therein a direction for the Treasurer to
make a search outside of his office for the taxpayer
ignores the plain fact that the legislature specifically
deleted such duties by its amendment of the statute in
1931. Any such construction is repulsive to the plain
wording of the section which now directs the Treasurer
to mail notices to the taxpayer at his address, "if known."
The legislature by its amendment in 1931 deleted the
affirmative duties of the Treasurer to seek out the
taxpayer. It placed on the Treasurer the simple, practical duty of sending notices to the taxpayer at his
address, "if known," and it gave some responsibility to
the taxpayer, only that of keeping the treasurer's office
advised of a current address. The majority opinion has
read into the statute a legislative intent to retain all
the duties of search on the Treasurer, despite their
specific deletion, and the explanation is made that the
amendment "was enacted during the depths of the depression when taxes were hard to collect." If the intent
was to increase the efficiency of the tax collecting procedure, certainty a shifting of some responsibility to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
the taxpayer would have effected both a savings to the
government of costs of search for delinquent taxpayers
and a better collection of taxes through better contact
with taxpayers.
The enlightened theory of courts of sister states in
this situation has been to place the burden on the taxpayer and to relieve the Treasurer from any search.
Spokane County v. Glover, 2 Wash. 2d 162, 97 P. 2d 628
(1940); Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P. 2d 303
(1940); Pender v. Ebey, 194 Okla. 407,152 P. 2d 268.
We submit that the amendment of 1931 was purposeful, clear and gave no need of interpretation of the remaining words "if known." I t gave some responsibility
to the taxpayer and took a burdensome, costly duty of
questionable degree of fulfillment from the Treasurer.
The taxing government and honest, diligent taxpayers
were all benefited at the expense only of the careless or
even evasive and dishonest taxpayer, as pointed out by
Justice Worthen in his dissenting opinion.
We believe that the forfeiture provisions of the
taxing statutes have a definite need. We recognize that
there must be a choice between a possible forfeiture to
insure the taxing government of its revenue and some
loss to the "slothful, careless, sleeping taxpayer." However, to assure against any forfeiture and to vitiate the
penalty provisions of the taxpaying statutes, we submit
that a construction should not be placed on these statutes
to strain the words "if known" to mean "if ascertainable"
and to retain a duty of dubious fulfillment on the
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Treasurer. We believe that such burden was purposely
removed from the Treasurer by the deletions of the 1931
amendment. If any latent legislative intent must be
divined, cannot the legislature be given credit of having
had a sensible, purposeful intent in bringing the law to
date consistent with economy and common sense 1
POINT III
THE MAJORITY OPINION MAKES AN ASSUMPTION
OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

By a bold assumption of facts the court has determined that "plaintiffs, as purchasers of the tax title,
would retain the benefits of an inequitable bargain in
which they purchased the property at a price obviously
greatly disproportionate to its value"; that this transaction was a "harsh bargain"; that defendants' forfeiture would necessarily be the result of "a harsh procedure," and that this was a controversy involving forfeiture with a "consideration relatively small in comparison to the value of the property." (Emphasis ours).
The record in this matter, both before the trial court
and on appeal, is brief and clear. Nowhere in that record
is there any proof or showing, direct or indirect, as to
the value of the property in question or any showing
as to value to compare with any amounts paid by plaintiffs on the tax sale. In making any assumption as to the
value of the land necessarily being greatly in excess of
the amount paid for the tax deed by the plaintiffs this
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Court was thereby going beyond the record or any inference raised from any facts in that record.
This court has repeatedly stated in its past decisions
the proposition that on appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiffs the Supreme Court is required to take all the
evidence and every reasonable inference therefrom in a
light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The corollary to
this rule necessarily must be that the Supreme Court
cannot go outside the record to determine facts or draw
inferences against the prevailing party in the trial court
if no facts for such finding or inferences were proved
or shown in the lower court. Kimball Elevator Co. v.
Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 2d 289; 272 P. 2d 583
(1954); Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760
(1953); Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 1, 261
P. 2d 927 (1953).
The assumption of facts as made by the majority
opinion is a prerequisite to a determination that there
was in this situation any inequity. It appears to us, as
suggested by Justice Worthen in his dissenting opinion,
that the majority of the Court is eager to avoid a "forfeiture" and to prevent a "harsh bargain." We submit
that any such end result should not be reached by making
an assumption of facts not allowed by the record nor
suggested by any facts or figures contained therein. No
inference of value or lack of it can be drawn if there
are no facts concerning value to infer from.
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CONCLUSION
The majority opinion of this Court leaves us with
the definite impression that its author has sensed some
inequity which must be righted by judicial inquiry necessarily beyond the record a n d / o r judicial interpretation
of the intent of the legislature beyond the plain wording
of the statutes.
The majority opinion forcefully raises the question
of whether the statutes through their clear wording,
natural intent and meaning and over-all necessary purpose should not be subordinated to the equities as sensed
by an appellate court. We believe that this opinion places
the personal determination of equities and the abhorance
of forfeiture above the clear purpose of the tax sale
procedures as firmed into statutory law by the legislature. We submit that this substitution of personal
economic and moral convictions for the written law,
unbounded by self-restraint to do good, constitutes error
both as to misapplication of facts and misconstruction
of law in this instance.
We believe that the majority opinion of this Court
is an example of the situation as cited by Justice Black
in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) where "The 'natural law' formula . . .
has been used in the past, and can be used in the future,
to license this Court, in considering regulatory legis- »
lation, to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy
and morals and to trespass, all too freely on the legislative domain of the States." (cited in "Judicial Self-
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Restraint: The Obligation of the Judiciary," Am. Bar
Jour., Vol. 42, Number 9, page 829, September, 1956.)
We believe that serious error has been committed,
and we ask that the Court reconsider the legal principles
enunciated and the assumptions of facts made in the
majority opinion and that this matter may be reheard
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES W. BELESS, JR.
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
1007 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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